Once adored for its stunning landscape, dancing peacocks, serene wilderness, tapestry of colourful traditional attire, melody of Mai Bhagi, swirling sand, fascinating temples and majestic sand dunes, Thar has now emerged as an axis of hunger, malnutrition, abject poverty and unrelenting deaths of children.
Tune in to any Sindhi tv channel and death toll in Thar with heart-rending footage marks every hourly bulletin.
The piling dead bodies were initially ascribed to a drought and famine that prompted sympathetic responses. The tragedy was considered as an isolated incident of the wrath of the nature, triggered by scant rainfall and an ensuing drought.
Many still consider Thar as a remote inaccessible territory. However, the reality on ground has drastically altered during recent years. The bewitching reservoir of Thar coal has converted Thar into a favourite destination of investors and officials. Metalled roads snake through the parched land, connecting major towns and randomly sprawled hamlets. The social fabric is going through a rapid jolt, leaving the local communities disarrayed.
Awaiting promised prosperity, the people of Thar are witnessing an unprecedented rise of religious outfits, frequent congregations of the faithful, sprawling seminaries and mosques. This social upheaval is eclipsing the once-cherished communal harmony that dominated the social landscape of Thar where faith never became a fault line.
An insidious shift in demography is another perilous phenomenon which is yet to unfold fully. Physical and digital connectivity of the area has extricated it from forlorn isolation, and distance is no more a pardonable excuse to justify unrelenting deaths.
In short, the socio-cultural and economic setting of Thar is going through a phenomenal shift that merits separate comprehensive research. The state and government exist with full tentacles in Thar and it is no more a desolate nature-dependent territory. In this context, the tormenting situation in Thar ought to be understood with a fresh approach.
Bad governance and pervasive administrative lapses multiply the impact of a natural shock not alien to the area otherwise.
Three recent reports unveiled a complex blend of administrative, social and political dimensions of this human tragedy. On the recommendation of Sindh High Court, the Sindh chief minister constituted a four-member commission to probe the Thar drought issue. Excerpts of a yet-to-be made public report provide an insight to the human-induced disaster.
The commission observed that there was a lack of coordination among the government’s departments for carrying out relief activities during drought. It also found huge coordination lapses among Town Municipal Administrations (TMAs), special initiative department, NGOs and public health departments. It also found that departments like social welfare, agriculture, environment, forest, population welfare, transport and tourism were underperforming.
The commission recommended setting up a provincial monitoring team having the representation of departments including health, food, livestock, irrigation and meteorology to report to the chief minister after every quarter. The drought commission called for preparing a comprehensive nutrition and drought policy and the related sectoral planning for issues ranging from poverty to education. The commission also found that local population had been excluded from reaping the fruits of development schemes, and urged the government to provide employment to the local population while excavating coal reserves.
Identifying an important administrative lapse, the report revealed that 309 posts of specialists, medical officers and others of BPS-17 to BPA-19 were lying vacant. The commission in its report stated that there were 14 ambulances in the entire district, out of which six were being used by the Mithi Civil Hospital. There is shortage of doctors in the hospitals in Thar. The commission also observed that doctors with domiciles of Thar were not willing to serve in the area and recommended the implementation of the Essential Services Act in letter and spirit.
Similar observations were echoed by the Chairman National Commission for Human Rights, Justice (Retd) Ali Nawaz Chohan. Presenting his report on Thar calamity, he lamented that the government of Sindh and its departments of health, education and local administration were responsible for the Thar tragedy.
Recently, appalling details were presented before the National Assembly Standing Committee on Human Rights. Members of the committee were told that 828 children had died in Thar over the past three years. Briefing the members of the committee, Fazila Aliani, a member of the committee from Balochistan, blamed corruption and lack of political will for the mounting deaths of children in Thar. Aliani further shared that the government decided to install 700 plants of reverse osmosis (water purification) but only 432 were installed and a number of them have become out of order.
The Senate’s committee was astounded while hearing from the Sindh government’s representative that the provincial government has spent more than 10 billion rupees during the last three years on public welfare. The situation on ground is different and one can hardly trace a fraction of the spending.
These reports show the political and administrative collapse in Thar that has intensified the impact of a natural calamity. A chronic deficit of human development and administrative neglect by successive governments has culminated in total chaos.
Droughts are not new to Thar. The Sindh Relief Department’s official data reveals that Thar witnessed five severe droughts, eight moderate and 11 mild droughts since 1965. Each time a fleeting response to the situation allowed it to perpetuate since the root causes were never addressed. Every drought was treated as an isolated episode and an integrated long term remedy was never contemplated. Free distribution of wheat was used as a magic wand to end the miseries of Tharis.
Seasonal migration has become an annual feature for the Thari community due to famine. The socio-economic indicators of Thar narrate the accumulated development deficit of the area.
An official document “Millennium Development Goals Report-2013” ranked Tharparkar as the second last in fully immunised children among the 23 districts of the province where 56 per cent children did not receive any immunisation doze. Similarly, the district was 20th out of the 23 districts on immunisation of children against measles, which shows only 61.7 per cent coverage. The district had 6th highest number of under five-year children who suffer from diarrhea. Only 13.6 per cent births were attended by skilled birth-attendants placing the district in the bottom within the province. Concomitant to that just 44.6 per cent pregnant women received antenatal care consultation.
According to the report, the district was the last on access to improved sources of drinking water and sanitation with only 17.2 and 7 per cent coverage.
The government of Sindh has shown little seriousness in addressing the root causes. Laying reverse-osmosis water treatment plants is being obsessively pursued. The idea was not bad had it been done with proper homework and due diligence. Plagued with customary malpractices, the project is set to become another scam marked with embezzlements and nepotism.
Thar does not need ephemeral charitable solutions it needs a well-meditated multi-sectoral long term strategy. One such promising project is extending Raini canal to Thar. The canal with the design discharge of 10,000 cusecs is currently under construction. The project has a design provision of an off-taking Thar canal with a capacity of 5000 cusecs.
The Sindh government has been spending billions of rupees on the lining of selected reaches of canals for inexplicable reasons. This amount can be diverted for betterment of millions of hapless communities of Thar. An immediate construction of Thar Canal can bring dramatic changes in the lives of Tharis.
It was a 9mm gun, probably a Stoeger. Before Saad Aziz got this “samaan” through an associate, by his own admission, he had already plotted a murder. On the evening of Friday, April 24, 2015, he met four other young men, all well-educated like him, somewhere on Karachi’s Tariq Road to finalise and carry out the plot. As dusk deepened into night, they set off towards Defence Housing Society Phase II Extension on three motorcycles. Their destination: a café-cum-communal space – The Second Floor or T2F – where an event, Unsilencing Balochistan: take two, was under way. Their target: Sabeen Mahmud, 40, the founder and director of T2F.
Two of Aziz’s associates, he says, “were just roaming around in the vicinity of T2F”. A third was keeping an eye on the street outside. Aziz himself was riding a motorcycle driven by one Aliur Rehman, also mentioned as Tony in the police record. When he received the message that Mahmud had left T2F, he says, he followed her. “Suzuki Swift, AWH 541,” he repeats her car’s make and registration number.
As the car stopped at a signal less than 500 metres to the north of T2F, “Tony rode up alongside it.” Mahmud was in the driving seat, Aziz says. “Next to her was her mother, I think. That is what we found out from the news later. There was a man sitting in the back. I fired the gun four or five times at her.”
“There wasn’t one particular reason to target her; she was generally promoting liberal, secular values. There were those campaigns of hers, the demonstration outside Lal Masjid [in Islamabad], Pyaar ho jaane do (let there be love) on Valentine’s Day and so on.”
Sitting in a sparsely furnished room within Karachi Police’s Crime Investigation Department (CID), Aziz appears at ease even in blindfold. Recounting the events of that evening, he never sounds hurried or under duress.
After shooting Mahmud, he says he and Tony turned left from the signal towards Punjab Chowrangi and reached Sharae-e-Faisal, crossing Teen Talwar in Clifton on their way. While still on the motorcycle, he messaged others to get back to Tariq Road. Once there, he just picked up his motorcycle and they all dispersed. “We only got confirmation of her death later from the news,” he says. “At that moment [of shooting], there is no way of confirming if the person is dead. You just do it and get out of there.”
It was on February 13, 2015, when he says he decided that Mahmud had to die. That evening, he was at T2F, attending an event, The Karachi “Situation”: Exploring Responses. “It was something she said during the talk,” he recalls. “That we shouldn’t be afraid of the Taliban, we should stand up to them, demonstrate against them, something like that. That is when we made up our minds.” Later in the conversation, though, he adds, “There wasn’t one particular reason to target her: she was generally promoting liberal, secular values. There were those campaigns of hers, the demonstration outside Lal Masjid [in Islamabad], Pyaar ho jaane do (let there be love) on Valentine’s Day and so on.” He laughs softly, almost bashfully, as he mentions the last.
Aziz remembers visiting The Karachi “Situation” seminar with Tony who, the police say, remains on the run. Pictures and video footage of the event show Aziz sitting at the end of a row, close to the entrance. Next to him is Tony, a round-faced young man with a dark complexion. The police say he is an engineering graduate from the National University of Sciences and Technology, Rawalpindi campus. “Tony had a Twitter account under a fake name and he used to follow Sabeen’s tweets very closely,” says Aziz. He also mentions another source of information. “About four weeks [after the discussion on Karachi], when I got emails about events being held there, I sent Tony there a few times to check if her car was there. It wasn’t.”
On April 24, 2015, Aziz says, he told Tony to go there again. “When he confirmed her car was there, we made the plan there and then.”
By that time, he confesses, he had taken part in 20 major and minor “operations” in Karachi. These include an attack – just eight days before Mahmud’s assassination – on American academic Debra Lobo, who taught at a college in Karachi, bank heists to put together money for their hit-and-run activities, multiple attempts to target the police and the Rangers and grenade attacks on co-education schools in Gulshan-e-Iqbal (on February 3, 2015) and North Nazimabad (on March 18, 2015).
Nineteen days after Mahmud’s murder, Aziz says he took part in an attack that elicited worldwide shock and condemnation: the assassination of 43 members of the Ismaili Shia community, including women and children, travelling in a bus in the Safoora Goth area on the outskirts of Karachi.
Aziz appears as a mild-mannered young man of medium height and build, with a trimmed beard. He makes a little joke about how he can instantly tell which law enforcement or intelligence agency the person asking him questions belongs to. “The first thing the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] want to know is whether there are any links with RAW [the Indian intelligence agency]; CID is interested in the funding aspect; and the police keep hammering on about what other wardaat (hits) we’ve been involved in.”
Aziz calls himself a Salafi, though his father says the family follows Sunni, not Salafi, Islam. When an interrogator asks him why he and his associates targeted Ismaili Shias, he cites their sectarian affiliation as the reason. “It is perfectly acceptable to take the lives of women and children for that reason.”
Aziz’s radicalisation began in 2009, following a visit to Saudi Arabia for umrah with his family. Upon his return to Pakistan, he decided to read translations of the Quran. “Until then I had only read it once in Arabic.” (One investigator, however, reports that Aziz could not recite certain Quranic verses that every practising Muslim recites at least once a day during Isha prayers.)
For a while, he joined the Tableeghi Jamaat. Then, he took to attending lectures by a scholar, Shaykh Kamaluddin Ahmed, a professor at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (Lums) at the time, whose Sufi interpretation of Islam is distinct from what the Tableeghi Jamaat stands for. “But neither [Ahmed] nor Tableeghi Jamaat even discussed jihad,” he says. “It was over time, primarily through reading the Quran, that I developed an inclination towards jihad.”
Aziz then met Tony, whom he suspected had contacts with militants. Tony made him wait for some time before introducing him to one Haris, an al-Qaeda operative. “[Haris] was heading al-Qaeda’s daawati (recruitment) wing for Pakistan at the time. I joined this wing at the end of 2010,” says Aziz.
In September 2013, Haris, whose real name is said to be Abu Zar, was arrested from a hostel of the Punjab University in Lahore, along with two others, for alleged links with al-Qaeda. In the last 22 months, the authorities have not produced him in any court of law for a trial. Police sources in Lahore say Haris and his associates are in ISI’s custody. This information, however, could not be confirmed through other sources.
In 2011, Aziz went to Waziristan for training where, he says, he was attached to a group headed by Ahmad Farooq, deputy head of al-Qaeda in the subcontinent and a former student of Punjab University. (Farooq was killed in an American drone strike in January 2015 in North Waziristan.)
By 2013, Aziz says he was disillusioned and frustrated. Instead of allowing him take part in terrorist operations, his handler Haris limited him to media duties — such as managing online jihadist publications. “In mid-2013, I met Haider Abbas,” says Aziz. Abbas introduced him to Tahir Minhas alias Saeen, identified by the police as a member of al-Qaeda.
As a senior, experienced commander, Minhas set the ground rules for the group that Aziz joined. “We all used aliases; I only know Tony by his real name,” says Aziz. He got his own alias — Tin Tin. “None of us would ask for the members’ real names, addresses or anything that could identify them in case one of us was arrested. That was on Minhas’s instructions.”
The cell had no designated ‘safe house’ to meet. Minhas often called its members for meetings to Jan Japan Motors, a car auction site on the Super Highway. He also selected the targets. The attack on Mahmud, though, was different. Aziz says it was on his own initiative. “Tahir wasn’t even there that day.”
In 2014, the sudden ascendancy of the Islamic State (IS) and its territorial gains in Iraq and Syria became a lightning rod for militants across the globe. In January this year, IS announced its expansion into Khorasan, a historical region comprising parts of present-day Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and some Central Asian countries. Several factions of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) immediately joined it.
“We just finished a 16-day joint investigation but we have not established any direct or indirect link between him and Daesh. Al-Qaeda’s tentacles, however, touch him in multiple ways. We are sure he is with al-Qaeda.”
“Among my acquaintances there was already a lot of discussion about the merits of al-Qaeda and Daesh [the Arabic acronym for IS]. Many of us felt that al-Qaeda was reduced to mainly talk and little action,” Aziz says. “We were in Waziristan when the creation of the [IS’s] Khorasan [chapter] was announced, and we pledged loyalty to its emir, [former TTP commander] Hafiz Saeed Khan.” (A senior official of the Intelligence Bureau in Peshawar says Khan was “in Tor Dara area in Khyber Agency’s Tirah valley in January 2015”, the time period to which Aziz refers.)
Subsequently, he says, some of his associates did pro-IS wall chalking and left propaganda pamphlets in parts of Karachi, especially at the scenes of some of the attacks they carried out. Some of the people working with him, he claims, have gone to Syria as part of an effort to strengthen their connection with the IS leadership there.
Weeks after Mahmud’s murder, Jaadu, her white Persian cat, would sit expectantly by the door of her house for hours every evening, waiting for a familiar footfall on the steps outside. Inside, her mother, Mahenaz Mahmud, sits on a chair looking like her daughter might have 20 years in the future — had she had that much time. The mother also exudes the same warmth, intelligence and artlessness as the daughter — and, since Mahmud’s death, a stoicism that would move a stone to tears.
“On April 24, Sabeen made breakfast for us (Mahenaz and Mahenaz’s mother) as usual. That was her routine. She would switch on the kettle, run to her computer, then she would put the bread in the toaster,” Mahenaz recalls with a chuckle. “She didn’t want me to have a cold slice, so she would toast the second slice only after I had finished the first.” They would usually chat away during breakfasts. “We would talk about all kinds of things.” Sometimes, Mahmud would seek her mother’s advice. “She would ask me what I thought of something being done at T2F. Sometimes we would flog some philosophical concept. We would share articles, then discuss them… there was lots that we talked about.”
That day, though, Mahenaz sensed something unusual. “I don’t know whether it was anxiety but there was some element about this Baloch missing people event, especially because of the talk that was cancelled at LUMS [under orders from the ISI],” she says. Mahmud was not moderating the session; she hadn’t even organised it. “Someone else wanted to do it and she had agreed to provide the space,” says Mahenaz. “But she talked to some people about it and then said to me “It’ll be ok, Amma””.
After breakfast, the mother went to work – she is an academic programmes advisor at a teacher training institute – but planned to attend the talk on the Baloch missing persons. “I hadn’t been to any event for a long time because I get quite exhausted by the evening but that day I had a very strong feeling that I must be around her.”
Following the event, around 9pm, Mahmud was planning to drop her mother home, pick up a friend and go to another friend’s place for dinner. “When Sabeen came out [of T2F], I remember she was in a hurry, and she told the driver to sit in the back. I got in the seat next to her and we drove off.”
A short distance away, the Sunset Boulevard traffic signal turned red and their car came to a stop. “It is impossible for me to process those five, 10 seconds,” Mahenaz says quietly. “I was talking to Sabeen, and my face was turned towards her. She was looking in front. A motorcycle came up along the side she was sitting, much too close for comfort. My eyes became riveted on a gun in someone’s hand. I said to Sabeen, “What do you think he wants? He’s got a gun.” I thought it was a mugging. All this must have taken only three or four seconds. Then the window shattered, and Sabeen’s head just tilted to one side; her eyes were open. There was not a moan, not a groan, not a whimper. Then pandemonium broke out around us.”
Mahmud was shot five times. Her mother also took two bullets: one in her back and another that, after going through Mahmud’s body, went into her arm and out again. She says she remembers feeling there was something “happening with my body but I wasn’t sure what.” She was too focussed on her daughter to be sure of anything else. “I was saying ‘Sabeen talk to me, give me some indication that you can hear what I am saying.’ Even though I knew that she had gone, somewhere there was a glimmer of hope.”
She herself was taken to the Aga Khan University Hospital for treatment. “Next morning, I started demanding that I wanted to go home. I was told that Sabeen’s body was being kept in a morgue and I thought she should be put on the way to her last journey immediately.” With a bullet still lodged in her back, she left the hospital to bury her only child.
When Mahenaz Mahmud learnt that the police had arrested some educated young men for carrying out the murder, it was a shock to her, almost a betrayal of some of her most closely held convictions. “I felt terrified. I am a person who teaches my students that we all have our biases and that we put people into boxes because we don’t have time to find out about each and every person.”
In the third week of June, T2F organised a qawwali session to celebrate her daughter’s birthday posthumously. While observing the audience from the back of the room, she couldn’t shake off a nagging thought. “I was looking at the young boys in the audience and wondering, ‘So what are they thinking? What is really going on in their head?’ Normally I wouldn’t have thought that about young people. I would be happy that all kinds of young people come to T2F. Now I am really scared about how these young men’s minds can be messed with.”
The senselessness of the murder is difficult for her to process. “I want to ask them, why? What happened to you? What was it that bothered you about Sabeen? Was it something she stood for? Did you just want to make an example out of her? Did you think that taking a human life is such a small matter? But then I realise that these people think very differently. Their paradigms are different. Their schemas are different.”
In another part of Karachi, sitting in her home studio, architect Marvi Mazhar, one of Mahmud’s closest friends, says: “I always knew. I always thought that if someone gets to her, it’ll be someone educated. Sabeen had to deal with a lot of hate speech, and from people who were all educated. They used to write, they used to tweet, they were all very tech-savvy. Every time she’d complain that these young bachas, I wish I could have chai with them, talk to them.”
Mazhar recalls an incident from last November. At the Creative Karachi Festival organised by T2F, the azan went unnoticed for a few moments in the hubbub and a young man angrily demanded that the music be stopped instantly. “Sabeen went up to the guy, took him aside and spoke to him for a while; a little later, he actually brought flowers for her by way of apology. There was this strange magic about her,” she says with a wistful smile.
In the days leading up to her death, Mahmud was particularly restless, says Mazhar. On Tuesday, April 21, there was a get-together of friends at Mazhar’s place where Mahmud was “a little agitated”. Mazhar heard her saying to someone on the phone, “If we are not going to do it now, then we won’t do it because after that I am leaving for London and I don’t have time.” She assumes this was about the talk on Baloch missing persons. “Her heart was not into this talk, mainly because she had so much going on otherwise. She believed in it, she believed that the Baloch must be given a platform. But, I felt, judging from the conversations I have had with her, she was waiting for a signal, waiting for someone to tell her not to do this.”
A sturdy metal barrier bars entry into a rough stretch at the end of Beaumont Road in Karachi’s Civil Lines. Only a few street lights illuminate the area; that, along with the dilapidated condition of the road, is perhaps deliberate, designed to make things a little more difficult for terrorists looking to target the CID headquarters that looms up on the right, after the barrier. They did exactly that on November 10, 2010, killing at least 17 people and injuring over 100 in a massive truck bombing. Access inside the CID premises now lies behind a raft of concrete barriers, designed to minimise the possibility of another attack.
Raja Umar Khattab, Senior Superintendent Police, strides into his office at around 10.30pm after taraweeh prayers. A stocky, barrel-chested man, he is wearing a bright yellow T-shirt with khaki pants, rolled up at the bottom and rubber slippers. He speaks in rapid-fire sentences; names of terrorists roll off his tongue like those of old acquaintances. Several phone calls interrupt conversation; a senior official has misplaced his cell phone and Khattab is trying to get it traced. “Sir, don’t worry. I’ll make sure it is back with you soon,” he says reassuringly.
As the CID’s lead investigator, Khattab is flushed with pride over the recent arrest of what he calls a major terrorist cell. He has no doubt the police under him have the men who killed Mahmud and committed the Safoora Goth massacre, apart from various other crimes.
Khattab believes it was a failed romantic relationship that sowed the seed for Aziz’s radicalisation.
The Sindh Rangers, too, have made a separate claim of arresting a mastermind of the attack on Ismaili Shias. “He has nothing to do with Safoora Goth incident; he never did,” says Khattab, shaking his head vigorously, when asked about the man arrested by the Rangers and reportedly linked to the detained office-bearers of the Fishermen’s Co-Operative Society. “When you go to a court to seek remand, you put in extra things. Otherwise it can get difficult to get a remand,” is how he explains the reason for the claim made by the Rangers.
More importantly, Aziz’s claim about his allegiance with IS meets with a similarly dismissive response. “We just finished a 16-day joint investigation but we have not established any direct or indirect link between him and Daesh. Al-Qaeda’s tentacles, however, touch him in multiple ways. We are sure he is with al-Qaeda,” says Khattab.
“And why should it be so surprising that these terrorists are so educated? There were always educated people in al-Qaeda. Educated people don’t join TTP. It is the madrasa-educated ones who join TTP. They have the desire for jihad but these [educated jihadis] are ideologues. They envision grander things,” he adds. And for that reason, Khattab states, they are far more dangerous: They can be anywhere — the shopping mall, the university, saying their prayers beside you.
Khattab believes it was a failed romantic relationship that sowed the seed for Aziz’s radicalisation. “He became disillusioned with worldly pursuits,” says the police officer. “When he joined Unilever for an internship [in the second half of 2010], he met Aliur Rehman – alias Tony – who was also working there.” Tony, a member of Dr Israr Ahmed’s Lahore-based Islamic movement, Tanzeem-e-Islami, was to play a vital role in Aziz’s radicalisation, inspiring him to fight for a Muslim caliphate, says the police officer.
But it was Minhas, the police claim, who turned Aziz into what he has become. In Khattab’s words: “Saad says Tahir motivated him so much that he no longer has any fear of killing people. His role in targeted killings was that of the shooter; by my reckoning, he has killed about 20 people.”
CID officials maintain that the terrorist group of which Aziz was a member had split from a larger al-Qaeda formation eight to 10 months ago. “While Tahir is its askari (militant) commander, he in turn answers to Abdullah Yousuf, who is in Helmand, Afghanistan. The other group formed by this rupture is led by Haji Sahib, Ramzi Yousef’s older brother,” says Khattab. He believes the crime spree by Aziz’s group, which hadn’t yet given itself a name, was aimed at raising its profile within the terrorist fraternity so that someone “owned” it.
Tracking down the group, he says, was not easy. They operated under aliases, did not use mobile phones and, instead, employed a Wi-Fi-based application called Talkray to communicate. The CID first picked up their trail sometime in 2014 through some men who were in prison, Khattab says. Based on the information obtained from them – he does not quite elaborate how but only says “we did some working on them” – the police picked up two former Karachi University students who had joined al-Qaeda through contacts at the campus and whose job was to maintain the organisation’s website. “We soon figured out that there is a network of educated al-Qaeda members in Gulistan-e-Jauhar, Gulshan-e-Iqbal and other areas around Karachi University,” he says.
The clues led the police to a sports teacher at Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology, who had set up a laboratory in his house in Gulshan-e-Iqbal where, along with his son and nephew, he used to teach young men to assemble Improvised Explosive Devices. The police also found a lot of written material that led them to conclude that a large al-Qaeda group was active in Karachi. “We found out it had two wings — one askari and one daawati.” The police do not divulge whether or not they have arrested and interrogated the teacher or, for that matter, any other details about his identity and whereabouts.
While investigating the people arrested earlier, the police learnt that Minhas was the group’s commander. Born in a village in the Jhelum district of Punjab, Minhas is a resident of Kotri, near Hyderabad, and has been in and out of police’s hands since 2007. According to an official source, one looking very closely into the massacre of Ismaili Shias, Minhas, (a matriculate, according to this source), had a thriving poultry business in Kotri at one point. He is also, says the same source, rabidly anti-Shia and has been a member of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a banned organisation involved in hundreds of acts of sectarian and religious terrorism.
Khattab and his team of investigators describe Minhas as a highly sophisticated militant, with his own signature style. They claim to have discovered important similarities in the terrorist activities he has carried out: in all of these, silencer-fitted imported Glock, Caracal and Stoeger pistols are used; he and his associates always hit their targets in the head. “By the time the Safoora Goth massacre happened, we had gathered lots of little clues,” says Khattab.
Some other clues materialised in September 2014 after a suspect named Amir Abbas managed to escape during an encounter with the police but his wife was injured and arrested. “We found plenty of incriminating material at his house and worked on it quietly from September [2014] to April [2015], matching and cross matching the evidence,” says Khattab.
This finally led to the arrest of Minhas and his associates, including Aziz. “When we recovered their laptops, their browsing history helped us connect them to other cases. “Had we been even one day late, all these boys would have left Karachi for Quetta, Waziristan etc.”
The CID officers also show what they call a hit list. These are A-4 size prints, carrying no information about their senders and receivers, but complete with photos and addresses of the targets, which include naval officers, intelligence agency personnel, police officers, showbiz personalities, journalists, workers of non-government organisations and three fashion designers. In some cases, the prints also carry details of the targets’ daily routine. When asked why the group wanted to target fashion designers, Aziz is quoted by Khattab to have said, “You kill three. No one will design sleeveless clothes again.”
At a distance from the police’s neatly tied narration, events take a rather mysterious turn. A former academic at the Institute of Business Administration (IBA) who once taught Aziz, and who has since moved to Europe, recalls his student as “being extremely close to [an intelligence agency]”. In April 2014, this academic needed a police clearance report for some work. Having tried unsuccessfully for a week to obtain it, he asked Aziz for help. “He told me it was no problem, and that he could get it for me in 10 minutes. He was wrong; it took him an hour.” This alleged link, however, could not be verified through any other source.
Aziz’s purported reasons for having targeted Mahmud are also rather mystifying. Many Pakistanis, weary of having their lives held to ransom by rampant militancy, make anti-Taliban statements the way she made at the talk on the Karachi situation. And on February 14 this year, Aziz’s restaurant had a promotional offer targeted at customers and their “loved ones” — complete with the image of two hearts placed right next to each other. Isn’t this just another way of saying pyaar ho jaane do? His account of planning her murder also mixes up a few details. He states that Tony was unable to spot Mahmud’s car outside T2F between the February 13 talk on Karachi and the April 24 discussion on Baloch missing persons. (Mahmud did leave Karachi on February 19 for an overseas trip and returned on March 5. She briefly went out of the country again from March 25 to April 5.) Between her arrival from abroad and her assassination, there were at least five events at T2F and she was also attending to her office work at T2F every day during this period. Can, then, her murder precisely on the day of Unsilencing Balochistan: Take Two be seen as purely a coincidence?
Whatever the motivation behind his actions – whether he is serving the ends of as-yet unknown masters or assuaging his own desire to ‘right’ society’s moral compass – his confession suggests that he is part of a cell carrying out orders issued by a central command structure. This is particularly evident in the Safoora Goth incident: an attack of that size and precision cannot be carried out by a motley group of like-minded individuals.
While Aziz has been singing in police custody, his confession may not stand the test of a trial in a court of law. Confessions before the police or a JIT, or any executive authority for that matter, have no legal standing. “[Only] a confession before a judicial magistrate has legal sanctity because a judge is an independent authority,” says Karachi-based lawyer Faisal Siddiqi. “A judge is not part of the investigation so he has no vested interest [in its outcome].”
Without independently verifiable evidence, it is virtually impossible to successfully prosecute any accused on the basis of their confessions alone. Ajmal Pahari, an alleged target killer, for instance, was acquitted in 2011 notwithstanding his on-camera confession of having committed over 100 murders. (He was soon re-arrested on additional murder charges, however, and is currently behind bars.) Aziz shows little concern about his trial and punishment when asked about his future. “What are my plans now?” he says completely unfazed, and laughing slowly. “We’ll go to prison, but we’ll break out of there. Then, we’ll make plans.”
A prominent Pakistani journalist and human rights activist, Khurram Zaki, has been shot dead in Karachi.
Mr Zaki was dining in a restaurant in the city’s north when suspects opened fire from motorbikes, reports say.
He was an editor of the website Let us Build Pakistan, which condemns sectarianism and is seen as promoting democratic and progressive values.
The spokesman for a splinter group of the Pakistani Taliban has said they were behind the shooting.
He said they killed him because of his recent campaign against a cleric of the Red Mosque in Islamabad.
Mr Zaki and other campaigners had filed a court case charging Abdul Aziz with incitement to hatred and violence against the Shia minority.
The case was brought in response to the cleric’s refusal to condemn attacks such as that on a school in Peshawar in 2014 in which 152 people, most of them schoolchildren, were killed.
Islamabad’s Red Mosque
Founded by Abdul Aziz’s father in 1965
Centre for hardline Islam in Pakistan since the 1990s
Attracts students from North-West Frontier Province and tribal areas where militant groups are strong
More than 100 killed as mosque raided by police in 2007 to dislodge heavily-armed militants sheltering there
Library named in honour of Osama Bin Laden
Video by female madrassah students in praise of so-called Islamic State
The school that says Bin Laden was a hero
Two other people were badly wounded in the Karachi attack, on Saturday night – a friend who Mr Zaki was dining with and a bystander.
Staff at the website paid tribute to their murdered colleague, and vowed to continue to stand up to militant groups.
Their statement said his contribution as a citizen journalist in supporting the rights of minority groups was “much bigger than [that of] all journalists combined in Pakistan”.
“His death is the grim reminder that whoever raises voice against Taliban [and other militant groups] in Pakistan will not be spared. And when they have to murder, they never fail.”
One recent afternoon, the writer Mohammed Hanif climbed out of his car at the Benazir Bhutto Martyr Park, in Karachi. Hanif, who is fifty, has a square jaw that juts from a square head, and he walks with the easy stride of a fighter pilot, which he once was. He was wearing a pair of knockoff Ray-Bans, which cost about fifty cents at a local stand, and smoking a Dunhill cigarette.
The park—built to honor the former Prime Minister, who was killed by a suicide bomber in 2007—is a kind of urban oasis. Karachi is a sprawling, chaotic city of some twenty-two million people, riven by ethnic strife and gang wars; its main crime-fighting force, the Pakistan Rangers, patrols the streets in pickups mounted with heavy machine guns. Hanif has made his home there since 2008, when he returned from London, where he worked for twelve years as a reporter for the BBC. As a novelist and a journalist, he has become perhaps the foremost observer of Pakistan’s contradictions and absurdities.
At the entrance to the park, a statue of Bhutto faces the street, waving toward the boisterous Karachi traffic. Hanif is writing these days about Bhutto, who is a divisive figure in Pakistan’s modern history and therefore exactly the sort of character that he is drawn to. “For a lot of people, Bhutto symbolized some kind of future that was going to be semi-normal, semi-peaceful, where people could get on with their lives without things always going bang, bang, bang,” Hanif said. But she stole one and a half billion dollars in public money; her husband, Asif Zardari, became known as “Mr. Ten Per Cent” for allegedly keeping a share of every government contract. Her military helped foster the creation of the Taliban, empowering terrorist groups that still plague Pakistan. When the park was finished, in 2010, the Bhutto statue was surrounded by a steel fence, to keep it from being defaced.
Inside the gates, the traffic noise receded; kids played cricket on a broad green lawn. Hanif lit another cigarette. He has a laconic, understated way of speaking, as though he were trying to downplay the outrage and the hilarity that animate his prose. “I used to come here quite a lot, when it was just a lake and some grass. There’d be couples making out, that sort of thing,” he said. “It’s nice that the government was actually able to build this—that the land wasn’t handed over to the usual people.”
In Pakistani cities, valuable land is often seized by powerful gangs or businessmen and cleared for construction. In the distance stood a line of high-rises, at least one of which was rumored to be owned by Zardari, who was President from 2008 until 2013. Within the park, Hanif spotted another illegal building, beside a lake. “Navy guys have built a ‘sailing club’ there,” he said. “You never see a single yacht, but they’ve just grabbed some land to make a private club.”
Hanif says that his novels only happen to be set in Pakistan, and that he has no great desire to explain the place to outsiders. But he acknowledges that the peculiar difficulties and injustices of the society help to give his fiction its manic edge. “I tried once to write a story about another galaxy, and it began to sound like Karachi,” he said. As a journalist, he has written boldly about the military’s repression of domestic dissent and its support of terrorist groups. In a pair of novels, he’s been more slyly devastating, portraying a country run almost entirely by backstabbing mediocrities, and a society where a woman who shows any gumption or intelligence usually ends up dead or disfigured. This kind of critique can be dangerous in Pakistan. While the constitution allows for a broad measure of free expression, people know better than to speak or write publicly about the powerful intelligence services or about crimes committed in the name of Islam. Since 1992, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, thirty-one Pakistani journalists have been murdered.
Hanif discourages the image of himself as a risk-taking dissident. When a fan at a reading a few years ago asked if he was a target of the security forces, he joked, “Stop giving people ideas.” In private, he is mindful of the connections that allow him latitude: he has a following in the West, and, as a former employee of the BBC, he holds a British passport. Ultimately, though, he hopes that what will protect him is his connection to the country itself. “I was born here,” he said. “I went to a government school in a village. My brother and sister still live here—all my childhood friends are still here. I served in the armed forces,” he went on. “Some writers become foreigners, even when they are living here. I don’t think I am a foreigner. Even the people who don’t like me, I’m one of them. I speak their language. I don’t travel with guards. I didn’t just fly in from England.”
When Hanif was born, Pakistan had been an independent nation for just eighteen years and an Islamic republic for nine. Notionally united by religion, it was divided by almost everything else: class, sect, language, ethnicity. Hanif grew up in a village in Punjab province, the home of the country’s historically dominant ethnic group, the Punjabis. His father was a farmer, like nearly everyone else there, and neither of his parents could read or write; the only book in the house was a copy of the Koran. Hanif borrowed books and read widely, starting in his first language, Punjabi. Then, as a teen-ager, he learned Urdu, the national language, and also English, which gave him access to British and American novels and to Russian and Latin-American works in translation. “English is the language that I associate with fiction,” he said.
Hanif felt stifled by small-town life. When, at sixteen, he found an Air Force recruitment ad in the local newspaper, he saw it as a way out; he signed a contract to serve for eighteen years.“My father couldn’t believe I had actually signed up,” he told me. In most of the world, the Pakistani military is not an esteemed organization; it has lost every war it has ever fought, including one with India, in 1971, in which a third of the Army was taken prisoner. Inside Pakistan, though, it has established itself as the preëminent arbiter of money and power. Until 2013, no elected civilian leader had ever handed power to another; generals always intervened.
In the Air Force, Hanif trained as a fighter pilot, flying an American-made T-37 twin-engine jet. But, he said, “I hated every minute I was there.” Whenever he could, he shirked duty to immerse himself in novels by Graham Greene and Joseph Heller; sometimes he read to his fellow-officers from “Catch-22,” which seemed especially relevant. “This was the life we’d been living, minus the war,” he said.
One afternoon in August, 1988, Hanif was sitting with friends in the officers’ mess, planning the evening. “The only TV channel in Pakistan suspended its normal transmission and started playing recitations of the Koran,” he said. “It was a big sign that something was up.” The recitations were followed by an announcement: a plane carrying Pakistan’s military dictator, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, had exploded in midair. (The explosion also killed many of Zia’s senior advisers and the American Ambassador Arnold Raphel.) Zia had taken power a decade earlier, when he overthrew Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—Benazir’s father—and ordered him hanged. “With the help of the Almighty Allah, the armed forces will do everything we can to insure stability,” Zia vowed. Instead, he presided over a vast, American-funded campaign to drive the forces of the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. The war, along with the huge quantities of weapons and money that streamed into the country, helped to radicalize Pakistan. On the day his plane blew up, Zia was headed to an Army base after inspecting American tanks that he wanted to buy.
When Hanif and his fellow-officers discovered that Zia had been killed, they celebrated, pooling their money to buy a bottle of illegal whiskey. “I mean, we were really happy,” he said. “Toward the end of Zia’s reign, he was completely losing it. He’d been around forever, and when leaders are around forever they start doing stupid things. Every couple of years, he’d come forth with a new version of the ‘True Islam.’ ” Zia had instituted a sweeping Islamization of Pakistani society, making such offenses as adultery and theft punishable by stoning and amputation. He took thousands of political prisoners, and ordered Bhutto loyalists flogged. “When he got blown up, it was kind of his due,” Hanif said. “It was clear that somebody had bumped him off.”
Three months later, Hanif left the Air Force, a decade ahead of schedule; his father had died, enabling him to leave on compassionate grounds. He became a journalist, writing about fashion, show business, and boxing; he also began to report for Newsline, the country’s most aggressive news magazine. It was an unglamorous life—he lived in run-down Karachi neighborhoods, where his roommates included gangsters and heroin addicts—but he loved the work. One of his early scoops was about student activists in Karachi, who were operating branches of violent gangs at their universities. Hasan Zaidi, a journalist who worked at a rival publication, recalls marvelling at Hanif’s sources: “We would read his stuff and say, ‘Why don’t we have this guy?’ He always had his fingers on the pulse of the street.”
In 1996, Hanif got an offer from the BBC to come to London and work for the Urdu-language service. He was newly married, to Nimra Bucha, an actress, and the job seemed to promise a break from the difficulties of life in Karachi. In an essay written later, he recalled, “People were being kidnapped for a few thousand rupees. Everybody’s cousin had been robbed at gunpoint. Carjacking was rampant. Even an obscure journalist like me had a gangster or two stalking him.” He told Pakistani friends that he’d return after three years. Instead, he stayed for twelve.
He became the head of the Urdu service, supervising a staff of sixty, and the job kept him enmeshed in Pakistani politics. In his sixth year, he got word that one of his reporters had been kidnapped by the I.S.I., the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency. Hanif feared that the reporter would be killed, but, on the advice of a contact in the I.S.I., he assigned a series of stories about the abduction. “The guy inside the I.S.I. said that if we wanted him released we should make a lot of noise,” Hanif said. “So we made a lot of noise.”
Before moving to England, Hanif had dabbled in writing plays that criticized the military. One of them was “What Now, Now That We Are Dead?,” written during a period of extrajudicial killings in Karachi. In the play, victims of the killings come back to life to survey the world they departed, then decide that it’s better to return to their tombs.
In London, he became consumed with figuring out who had killed Zia. He made phone calls and researched the lives of those around Zia, trying to assess potential culprits: the C.I.A., the Israelis, the Indians, the Soviets, rivals inside the Army, and even, according to one theory, a case of mangoes that had been carried aboard the plane for a celebration and then had exploded spontaneously. He was met with silence. “No one would talk—not Zia’s wife, not the Ambassador’s wife, no one in the Army,” he said. “I realized, there’s no way in hell I’ll ever find out.”
If he couldn’t solve the mystery, he could address it in a novel, he decided: “What if, fictionally, I raise my hand and say, ‘Look, I did it’?” The idea grew into “A Case of Exploding Mangoes,” a satirical thriller built along the lines of a Pakistani “Catch-22.” Hanif’s narrator and proxy is Ali Shigri, an Air Force trainee who escapes the absurdities of military life by marching obsessively and by smoking high-grade hash, bought from the squadron’s laundryman, Uncle Starchy. Shigri has a good motive to attempt an assassination: his father was murdered on Zia’s orders. But, in Hanif’s telling, nearly everyone in Pakistan wants to kill Zia. His intelligence chief conspires to pump VX gas into the cabin of his plane; a mango farmer plants a bomb, hoping to inspire a Marxist-Maoist revolt. Zia is even pursued by a crow, carrying a curse bestowed by a blind woman whom he condemned to a dungeon.
The historical Zia was humorless and self-regarding, a violent autocrat who liked to be spoken of as a “man of faith” and a “man of truth.” In “Mangoes,” he is a buffoon—paranoid that his underlings are plotting against him, distracted by a long-running fight with his wife, who has kicked him out of their bedroom, and tormented by an itchy infestation of rectal worms. At one point, trying to determine what his subjects think of him, he disguises himself with a shawl and rides into the city on a borrowed bicycle. The disguise works so well that he is detained by a policeman, who mistakes him for a vagrant and gives him a humiliating mandate: “Say ‘General Zia is a one-eyed faggot’ thrice and I’ll let you go.”
If the book’s satire seems cartoonish at times, it is also fearless. The military men are hapless schemers, in thrall to American advisers; the narrator is involved in a gay relationship with another pilot. (“I thought I needed to put some sex in the novel, but it was set in an Air Force barracks,” Hanif said.) Hanif has spoken of fiction as “the opposite of journalism.” But he acknowledges that the book was informed by his years of reporting, and by interviews with survivors of Pakistan’s dungeons. The most sinister figure is an I.S.I. officer, Major Kiyani, whose name evokes that of Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pakistani Army’s notorious chief of staff. To Americans, Kayani is known for presiding over an elaborate double game, in which Pakistan took billions in U.S. aid to help with the war in Afghanistan while covertly sponsoring the Taliban. The fictional Kiyani is both a dandy and a demented torturer, “the kind of man who picks up a phone, makes a long-distance call, and a bomb goes off in a crowded bazaar.” He, too, is involved in a plot to kill Zia.
As Hanif refined the manuscript, he told no one in Pakistan what he was working on. He and Bucha sat up nights in their apartment in London and wondered what the reaction would be. “At one point, I decided I should change the names of the characters,” he said. “But I wrote a few pages like that, and it just wasn’t any fun, so I switched back.” He drew inspiration from Mario Vargas Llosa, the Peruvian writer and politician, whose novel “The Feast of the Goat” tells the story of Rafael Trujillo, the longtime dictator of the Dominican Republic. In the book, Trujillo is depicted as a brute, but also as an impotent bed wetter. “I realized it was O.K. to do this,” Hanif said. “It gave me a kind of permission.”
When he finished the novel, in 2007, he pitched it to a Pakistani publisher he knew. “She wouldn’t even look at it,” he said. His old employer, Newsline, agreed to publish the book, but the printing company that it hired refused to be involved. Finally, Random House in India—Pakistan’s neighbor and archenemy—bought the manuscript and agreed to ship several thousand copies to Pakistan. According to Chiki Sarkar, who was then the head of Random House in India, the potential for controversy was appealing. “I insisted that Zia’s face be on the cover,” she said. “We pitched it as the book that no one in Pakistan would publish.” One early shipment was held up when a customs agent opened a box and saw Zia’s image. Soon afterward, Hanif, along with his wife and son, returned to Karachi to live.
When “Mangoes” was released, Hanif’s Pakistani friends were shocked: after a decade of repressive martial law, he was brazenly mocking the military. “He will just say anything,” Kamila Shamsie, a fellow-novelist, remembers thinking. For many people, though, the satire was welcome. “Hanif is essentially saying, Let’s not see Zia as a big man, as a monster—let’s see him as a pathetic man,” Shamsie told me. “This book feels like revenge.” It got stellar reviews in Pakistan, not least because the country was enduring another military dictatorship: General Pervez Musharraf had seized power in 1999. The critic Husain Nasir described the book as “engaging in rhythm, innovative in style, sardonic in voice, facts oozing out with beguiling charm.” It was long-listed for a Man Booker Prize.
A few times, Hanif had indications that “Mangoes” had reached powerful people. A general approached him at a party and asked who his sources were; others asked how he had managed to unravel the assassination plot. Zia’s son sent a message to complain—but, Hanif said, it was clear that he hadn’t read the book. Remarkably, there was no official backlash. “I think I was helped by the fact that no one in the military reads novels,” he said.
The book’s other great advantage was that it was written in English. The English language occupies a paradoxical place in Pakistani society: it is a holdover from colonial times, which are not favorably remembered, yet it remains the language of government, of the military, and of the upper classes and those who aspire to join them. Nearly half of Pakistanis are illiterate, and many of the rest speak Urdu, or one of the local languages; the audience for journalism and fiction in English is an impassioned but relatively tiny élite. This situation presents both limits and opportunities. Writers in English have far more latitude to criticize authorities, both secular and religious, without retribution. Clerics tend not to read English, or to care much about the opinions of upper-class intellectuals; politicians are largely concerned with the vastly greater numbers of people who read primarily Urdu, Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, or Balochi. When Hanif’s English-language reporting has exposed corrupt or mendacious leaders, the official reaction has often been benign. “Sometimes you get this feeling that you are basically writing for like-minded people,” he said.
The success of Hanif’s début elevated him to the first tier of Pakistani writers in English, joining Mohsin Hamid (“How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia”) and Daniyal Mueenuddin (“In Other Rooms, Other Wonders”). But, while much Pakistani fiction centers, like Hamid’s, on the lives of the upper class, or, like Mueenuddin’s, on fading feudal traditions, Hanif focusses on the sordid elements of society, and on the failures of the country’s self-styled guardians. Chiki Sarkar, the publisher, said that Hanif was distinguished by his relatively humble origins. He grew up in a middle-class family, went to a government school, and stayed in Pakistan for college; his work as a journalist has brought him closer to the struggles and disappointments of ordinary Pakistanis. “Hanif writes in English, but his world and his imagination and his humor come from a non-English language,” she said. “He writes in a spirit of delinquency.”
Hanif lives in Defence, a neighborhood of stately homes on the Arabian Sea. It’s one of the nicest parts of Karachi, filled with the kind of people who might buy Hanif’s books, but its affluence is deceptive. Many of the homes are barricaded by sandbags and cement walls and protected by armed guards; the residence of the current Home Minister of Sindh province, a few houses down from Hanif’s, resembles a fortress. Generators counter the city’s chronic electricity shortage. Defence may be a neighborhood of oligarchs, but, as one Pakistani writer told me, in Karachi you can live like an oligarch on a hundred thousand dollars a year.
Hanif lives in a comfortable two-story house, which, like most of the others, is surrounded by walls. But he does not employ an army of servants, and, inside, the place is homey and unostentatious. When you walk through the gate, you are greeted by Hanif’s two pet dogs, a conspicuously Western touch; in a Muslim country, dogs are generally seen as supersized vermin.
Hanif does what he can to stay in touch with the “pulse of the street.” He regularly returns to his home village to see old friends. He often writes in Urdu—plays and song lyrics as well as journalism—and he appears on Urdu-language television. The effect of his work in Urdu is more pronounced, he says; more people call him to comment on his pieces, and his criticisms of the government or the military carry more punch. But his most transgressive writing doesn’t always reach the largest audience. Eight years after its publication, “Mangoes” has yet to be published in Urdu. When he and Bucha, who acts in Urdu-language films and soap operas, appear together in public, she is recognized more often than he is.
For years, as Hanif read the Pakistani newspapers, it seemed that every day there was at least one story about an attack on a woman: shot by her brother, or stoned to death by a mob, or sentenced to death after her husband’s family accused her of insulting the Prophet. When I arrived in Karachi, the story was about a woman who had been set on fire by relatives.
In 2008, Hanif began to imagine a story about a female avenger fighting back against Pakistan’s patriarchal society. “I just had this idea of a female superhero flying around and kicking ass,” he said. He was also inspired by his boss at Newsline, an editor named Razia Bhatti, who pushed him to go after powerful public officials. “The stories back then were printed on these long rolls of paper, and she used to sit with me and go through my stories line by line. She was a real crusader—absolutely fearless.”
After a few tries, Hanif found himself uncomfortable with the superhero conceit—“I was afraid I was writing a bad Hong Kong type of movie”—and he gave it up. Then another scenario occurred to him. Years before, his mother had fallen ill and was taken to the hospital. He sat with her for days, in a ward staffed around the clock by female nurses, most of them Christians, a tiny minority in Pakistan. “So many institutions in Pakistan don’t work at all, and I was struck by how dedicated the nurses were,” he said. “Their salaries are very low. No one was supervising them—it was the middle of the night—and yet they carried on in the most dedicated way.”
Hanif got the idea of writing about a nurse in a decrepit hospital. Alice Bhatti (named for his old editor) is a ferociously strong young woman: smart, independent, and rebellious to the point of recklessness. She works as a nurse in the Sacred Heart Hospital for All Ailments, a shambling Catholic institution in Karachi that is corrupt, underfunded, and horrifyingly filthy: rats make nests of human hair; gunnysacks filled with body parts sit in a corner. Alice is Christian, the daughter of a faith healer, from a Christian slum called the French Colony, where Jesus is known as “Lord Yassoo.” She comes from a family of “sweepers,” or janitors, a job performed overwhelmingly by Christians. At the hospital, Alice sees the most vicious tendencies of Karachi—murders and molestations that go unreported, bodies that go unclaimed. She freely mocks the Islamic faith, in concert with her father, who warns her, “These Muslas will make you clean their shit and then complain that you stink.” More than anything, Alice is determined to defend herself from an endless wave of insults and assaults:
There was not a single day—not a single day—when she didn’t see a woman shot or hacked, strangled or suffocated, poisoned or burnt, hanged or buried alive. Suspicious husband, brother protecting his honour, father protecting his honour, son protecting his honour, jilted lover avenging his honour, feuding farmers settling their water disputes, moneylenders collecting their interest: most of life’s arguments, it seemed, got settled by doing various things to a woman’s body.
When a wealthy patient’s relative tries to force Alice to perform oral sex, she slashes his genitals with a razor and dispatches him to the emergency room. “Go to Accidents. And no need to be shy, they get lots of this sort of thing during their night shift,” she says. “And stop screaming.”
In another city, Alice might have called the police. Instead, her primary contact with law enforcement is Teddy Butt, a bodybuilder who works nights on a police death squad. Butt—a simpleton with a steroid abuser’s high-pitched voice—becomes infatuated with Alice, and professes his love while holding her at gunpoint. When she rebuffs him, he leaves the hospital and, in despair, fires his pistol into the air. The bullet wings a truck driver, who slams on his brakes, which causes a rickshaw to swerve, which kills five schoolchildren crossing a street, which sets off a riot that spreads across Karachi, as thousands of aggrieved citizens sack restaurants, burn tires, and overturn cars. The mayhem lasts for three days; eleven people die and entire neighborhoods are destroyed before things settle down. “Newspapers start predicting ‘Normalcy limping back to the city,’ ” Hanif writes, “as if normalcy had gone for a picnic and sprained an ankle.”
“Our Lady of Alice Bhatti” is a funny book, more light-footed than its subject matter suggests, but its power lies in its portrayal of how Alice is relentlessly crushed. Finally, Alice agrees to marry Teddy—largely to move into a roomier apartment—but he is bewildered by her high-spiritedness and sets about trying to make her behave like a proper wife. When she tries to leave him, he feels “dishonored” and seeks a time-honored remedy: he throws acid in her face. Alice may have been a superhero, Hanif suggests, but in Pakistan not even female superheroes can prevail.
The Karachi Press club is situated in a mansion built during colonial rule, with high wooden shutters to keep out the heat and palm trees on either side. Reporters sit at tables on the grounds, smoking and chatting. Every afternoon, people with grievances against the government gather to demonstrate, sometimes by the thousands. It’s a curious ritual—the demonstrators coming to the reporters, rather than the other way around. “It works this way because the reporters are too lazy to go out,” Hanif, who visits the club occasionally, told me.
The Pakistani press corps works with a strange mixture of privilege and constraint. Pick up one of the better English-language newspapers—the News or the Dawn—and you will find penetrating coverage of national security, poverty, and governmental corruption. But, beyond shifting and mysterious boundaries, no journalist may stray without risk. In 2010, Umar Cheema, who had written about dissent within the military, was picked up by men in police uniforms who were widely presumed to be I.S.I. agents. They shaved his head, sexually humiliated him, and dropped him miles from his home, with a warning to stop. The following year, Saleem Shahzad published stories asserting that the armed forces had been infiltrated by Al Qaeda. He was beaten to death and his body dumped in a canal.
The infiltration of the armed forces by Islamist militants has long been a dangerous topic; the country’s blasphemy laws are another. In the past few years, there has been a third: the bloody insurgency in the state of Balochistan, where the military and the intelligence agencies have been accused of a campaign of kidnappings, torture, and executions. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, thirteen reporters covering Balochistan have been murdered since 1992. In 2014, Hamid Mir, the country’s best-known television journalist, who has criticized the Army and the I.S.I. in his pieces, was shot six times by unknown gunmen as he drove to work. Since then, Mir says, his television station has stopped reporting aggressively on Balochistan.
In 2012, Hanif was asked by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan to write a series about dissidents who had disappeared in Balochistan. Hanif’s reporting was compiled in a small book, “The Baloch Who Is Not Missing & Others Who Are,” and also published in English-language newspapers. After the stories came out, Hanif received a call from an old Air Force friend who had become a general. “I heard some people talking badly about you,” the friend said. “Why do you put yourself at risk?” Hanif interpreted the call as a calculated warning: “He was passing me a message.”
There were other signs that even the English-speaking élites were no longer safe. In January, 2011, the governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, was shot dead by his bodyguard after he denounced the death sentence of an impoverished Christian woman, who was charged with insulting the Prophet after a group of Muslim women refused to drink from a bowl that she had touched. “That was a seismic shift,” Kamila Shamsie, the novelist, said.
Last April, Sabeen Mahmud, a close friend of Hanif’s who ran a local event space called the Second Floor, was planning a panel discussion involving Baloch leaders. Worried that the I.S.I. would react badly, she turned to Hanif for advice. He told her that it would be very risky, but Mahmud decided to go ahead anyway.
Hanif was out of town the night of the discussion, but he followed it on Twitter, and was relieved when it came to an end without incident. A few minutes later, he got a call from a friend: gunmen had pulled alongside Mahmud’s car and opened fire, killing her and wounding her mother. “It really shook me,” he said. “I used to think, like Sabeen, that we were really small fry. Who the hell cares about a hundred and twenty people sitting in a room talking, a bunch of like-minded losers?” Mahmud’s death was a measure of how much things had changed in Pakistan. The stories Hanif had published about Balochistan were “impossible now,” he said.
The police announced that they had arrested a suspect in the killing, but nothing about him fit the profile of an assassin: he was a student at one of the most prestigious universities in Pakistan. Many of Mahmud’s friends suspected that she was killed by the I.S.I. In September, her driver, who witnessed the killing, was also shot dead. After Mahmud was killed, a large group of supporters gathered at the Karachi Press Club, planning a series of protests to demand the truth about what had happened to her. Hanif joined them. “I am not a protester by nature, but it seemed like the decent thing to do,” he said. There was a good crowd, he said, nearly two hundred people. But it rapidly petered out. On the twentieth day, Hanif told me, only three people came.
Hanif’s audience seems not to have lost its appetite for outrage, or at least for comic relief. During a discussion at the Karachi Literature Festival, a woman in the audience stood and asked him to write another coruscating novel, like his first one. “ ‘A Case of Exploding Mangoes’ was so close to the truth,” she said. “My copy is in tatters now, because ten of my friends borrowed it.”
Hanif’s most rambunctious new work is “The Dictator’s Wife,” a musical that he wrote with the composer Mohammed Fairouz, which will have its première at the Kennedy Center in January. The main characters are unnamed—known only as the First Lady and her husband, Himself—but they bear an unmistakable resemblance to Pervez Musharraf and his wife, Sebha. The dictator in question never appears onstage. As his wife scrabbles with angry protesters and gripes about her compromised marriage, he is sequestered in the bathroom, represented only by a mordant song that his aide-de-camp sings on his behalf:
When you’re forced to bugger
200 million people
You need time to recover.
After you have rigged the elections
After all your positive actions
You need a few moments of self–reflection
Me time.
This kind of antic effect has grown scarcer in Hanif’s writing, which has become increasingly tragic. Last year, Fairouz asked him to collaborate on an opera about Benazir Bhutto. Hanif had considered writing a book about her, but decided that her life—filled with death, corruption, and betrayal—was too dramatic. “It’s too over the top,” Hanif told me. But opera seemed like a fitting medium. “In opera, everyone gets killed, and everything is over the top anyway,” he said.
Hanif knew Bhutto glancingly; while he was living in England, she was also there, having fled arrest warrants in Pakistan after the collapse of her scandal-ridden government. On occasion, she came into the BBC office to talk about the news from home.
In 2007, Bhutto was granted amnesty, and that October she returned to Pakistan to run for a third term. Less than an hour after she arrived, a suicide bomber attacked her motorcade, killing more than a hundred and forty people. “No one thought something like that could happen again,” Hanif said. “Once she survived it, she’d be safe.” Two months later, she was attacked again, by a suicide bomber and men firing weapons. This time, she was killed.
The Pittsburgh Opera plans to stage “Bhutto” in 2018. As Hanif revises the libretto, he and Fairouz sift through ideas in long telephone calls. The libretto has moments of Hanif’s anarchic humor: one of the main characters is a cabinet minister named Maulana Whiskey (essentially, Whiskey Priest), and Benazir is called by her childhood nickname, Pinkie. But most of the story seems haunted by thirty years of political and social tumult. It consists of three acts, each centering on a momentous death: Zia’s hanging of Benazir’s father, the explosion of Zia’s plane, and Benazir’s assassination.
“Bhutto” will no doubt cause a stir in Pakistan, whether or not it is staged there. A large part of the population holds the memory of Benazir’s family sacred, and the question of who killed her is unresolved. Musharraf, who was President at the time, is now on trial for the murder in Islamabad. He has maintained that, when an intelligence report suggested Bhutto might be attacked, he did everything he could to protect her. But Bhutto’s lobbyist in the United States, Mark Siegel, testified that Musharraf denied a request from Bhutto for more security, telling her, “Your security is dependent on the relationship between us.”
Bhutto’s legacy also lingers in more urgent ways. The Taliban, which flourished during her Administration, is surging in Afghanistan, and its affiliates are at war with the Pakistani state. In a recent Op-Ed piece in the Times, Hanif recounted a series of attacks in Pakistan, including a raid on a school that killed a hundred and forty children. Afterward, the Army claimed the attacks were evidence that “hard targets,” such as airports and military bases, had become too difficult to strike. “The language used to report and commemorate these massacres is sickeningly celebratory and familiar,” Hanif wrote. “The students are called martyrs. Their courage is applauded.” He went on, “How much courage does it require to take a bullet in the head? . . . This is imposed martyrdom, and it isn’t a sign of strength. It’s a sign of utter helplessness.”
For the first time in years, Hanif has begun to wonder about his future in Pakistan. Bucha, his wife, has asked him to stop appearing on television, out of concern for his safety. “It’s something I think about all the time,” she told me. “In Pakistan, you don’t have to be outspoken to be killed. The people we might be afraid of are people we don’t even know.” She and Hanif talk about whether the family should leave the country again. In the meantime, he sometimes encourages rumors that he’s living abroad.
When Hanif worked at the BBC, he used to go to the office each day hoping that Pakistan would not make the news. It seldom happened that way. For a writer engaged with politics, there has been a benefit. Politically turbulent societies often produce extraordinary literature: Russia in the twilight of the tsars, India after independence, postwar Latin America. Pakistan, reliably chaotic since 1947, has served Hanif as a wellspring of characters and ideas. Still, he insists that he would be happier if the country somehow became calm. “I never want to leave,” he said. “If Pakistan were normal and boring, I would love that. I’d shut my mouth for a while, if that was the price.”
After his swearing-in in September 2014, President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan approached Pakistan sensibly. He did not demand military operations against the Haqqani Network and other Taliban networks based in Pakistan because he knew Islamabad would never do that. Rather, he pleaded with Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. Despite trying to smooth over relations with Pakistan after taking over the country from his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, Ghani’s stance was clear. He repeatedly said that Pakistan is in a “state of hostility with Afghanistan” and uses its proxies–chief among them, the Taliban–to exert pressure on Afghanistan for strategic gains.
This strategy of pursuing peace talks did not yield the desired result for Afghanistan. There were some occasional talks over the last two years, but the fighting has never quite gone away. The Taliban have once again vowed to launch a series of brutal attacks all over Afghanistan, invalidating and disregarding Ghani’s pleas for peace talks. A suicide attack and gun battle in Kabul in front of an National Directorate of Security (NDS) office claimed 64 lives and left 347 wounded on April 19, for example.
The Taliban has done this very thing throughout the past 13 years. They give glimpses of hope for peace in the winter months, since they cannot fight in the cold, only to take up arms again once their traditional fighting season begins.
Following the Kabul attack, Ghani summoned a joint session of the two houses of parliament. He addressed the nation and made bold announcements unlike any leader since Mohammad Najuibullah in the 1990s. Ghani said he no longer wants Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. He also added that the Taliban shed the blood of their own people and land for others’ interests. He added that the period of amnesty and soft behavior was over. Taliban who have been sentenced to death shall be executed soon, Ghani pledged. Despite these bold remarks, he said that Afghanistan’s door is open to those who lay down their weapons and put an end to militancy. His stance was applauded by many Afghans on social media. People of Helmand province subsequently held a rally in support of the president’s remarks.
This is a major shift in Afghanistan’s outreach strategy to Pakistan and the Taliban. Karzai played at soft diplomacy with Pakistan throughout his presidency, in a bid to convince Islamabad to bring the Taliban to peace talks. He once publicly stated that he would side with Pakistan if there were to be a war between the United States and Pakistan; he even called the Taliban his “brothers.” But none of this rhetoric produced results.
Ghani’s statement at the joint session was not driven merely by emotion. He laid the ground for his strategy. Pakistan has always disowned the Taliban, but Ghani’s multilateral diplomacy essentially saw Pakistan confess that the Taliban are trained and sheltered in Pakistan. During his tour to the United States in March, Pakistan’s foreign affairs adviser, Sartaj Aziz, admitted that Pakistan houses the Afghan Taliban.
On top of everything, Ghani is making advancements on diplomatic and military grounds with regional countries. His approach toward Central Asian countries is another example of his pragmatic diplomacy. Central Asian countries share the same fear of Islamist expansion in the region, as does Russia. Ghani’s national security adviser and top decision maker, Hanif Atmar, played a considerable role in furthering diplomatic missions with Russia, China, and India. Atmar traveled to India in November 2015 and China in April 2016. His visits with Russian officials and tour to China brought fruit militarily. China offered military aid to the Afghan National Army following Atmar’s visit to Beijing.
Moreover, after Russia allegedly approached the Taliban to help the group fight ISIS in Afghanistan, Atmar tried to convince Moscow that it was in its best interest to support Afghan forces instead of the Taliban–not only to fight ISIS, but all militant groups. Following his talks with Russian officials, Moscow gifted 10,000 automatic rifles to the Afghan Security Forces. Ten thousand automatic rifles might not mean a lot for a country’s military, but Moscow’s willingness for military cooperation speaks to the success of Ghani’s regional outreach.
The Taliban’s number one demand for a long time has been the withdrawal of the U.S. military from Afghanistan, but they continue their offensives, even after the U.S. military completely ended its combat mission in 2014. Thirteen years of appeasement and amnesty could not convince the Taliban to cut a peace deal. It is now sensible to stop investing Afghanistan’s resources in peace talks and start investing them in building up the country’s security forces. Finally, Afghanistan must put more diplomatic pressure on Pakistan and encourage the international community to do the same. This is now Ashraf Ghani’s plan.
Samim Arif is an Afghan Fulbright scholar. He studies Political Journalism and Public Relations at Indiana University.
MULTAN, April 22: The Punjab Home Department has constituted a joint investigation team to probe Chotu Gang into abduction and killing of police personnel, which invited military intervention in the operation across the riverine area of River Indus
The JIT is constituted under Section 19 of the Anti Terrorism Act 1997 to finalise the investigation in the case (FIR No 47/16) registered under sections 302/ 324/ 395/ 353/ 186/ 148/ 149 of PPC, 3/4 ESA and 7-ATA registered with Rajanpur’s Bangla Achha Police Station.
The Home Department circular says the JIT would comprise five officials including a convener and four members. DG Khan DPO Capt Atta Muhammad would head the JIT with Bahawalpur Counter Terrorism Department DSP Aftabullah, one representative each from ISI and Military Intelligence, and Bangla Achha SHO Pervaiz Akhtar.
The Home Department has requested Punjab CTD Additional IG and sector commanders of ISI and MI for deputing special representatives for the JIT.
Security sources confided to The News that revelations were expected in coming days regarding politicians’ involvement in patronising and protecting the gang. They predicted that the JIT would ascertain the Indian arms smuggling chain, which operates from Cholistan across Pak-India border.
The security sources believed that Chhotu tried to mislead by claiming that he had purchased arms from Afghanistan. The Indian weapon smuggling was easier and safer from Cholistan then Afghanistan, as the arms smugglers were infiltrating from Jaisalmer into Cholistan.
According to the sources, the arms’ supply chain travels from Cholistan to the River Indus’ riverine areas and then further proceeding to Sindh and Balochistan. The Baloch separatists are receiving Indian arms from this route.
The sources said the JIT could investigate linkages between the Chhotu Gang and political elite to establish political backing the gangsters had been enjoying. The JIT might also establish connections between the Chhotu Gang and sectarian outfits particularly Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
The Chhotu Gang had abducted eight policemen in 2013 and demanded release of four high-profile LeJ operatives in exchange. The Basti Malok police of Multan were investigating the LeJ operatives involved in bomb blasts in Balochistan and other terrorism incidents across the country.
The JIT may also review the political pressure into the release of LeJ operatives in exchange of the kidnapped policemen.
The skies are no longer a very friendly place to fly if you’re brown or “maybe-Muslim”. A few days ago, an Iraq-born researcher at UC Berkeley was removed from a Southwest Airlines plane for speaking Arabic. A passenger heard the guy end a phone call with “inshallah” and decided it must mean “this plane full of infidels is going down”. In reality inshallah (which translates as “God willing”) is a versatile Arabic phrase that can be used to mean everything from “hopefully” to “never going to happen” to “I’ve stopped listening now, kthanxbye.”
This isn’t the first time someone has raised suspicions simply by speaking Arabic – the world’s fifth most-spoken language – on a plane. Fearmongering around terrorism has ignited a vicious vigilantism in air travel. The 17th century had the Salem witch trials; the 1950s had McCarthyism; today we’ve got Mile High Hysteria.
Last November, for example, two Palestinian-Americans were blocked from boarding a Southwest flight after another passenger heard them speaking Arabic and felt “uncomfortable”. Shortly after that incident, Spirit Airlines kicked four passengers of Middle Eastern descent off a flight because one of them was making calls in another language.
You don’t even need to be speaking Arabic to raise suspicions among “concerned citizens”, you simply need to be doing something a little “terroristy”. Like not being white. Last month, Laolu Opebiyi, a (Christian) Brit of Nigerian descent was removed from an easyJet plane after another passenger saw the word “prayer” in his Whatsapp messages.
Oh, but these are just the times we live in, some might say. It’s not bigotry, it’s security! Better safe than sorry! Indeed, what better way to fight terrorism than through irrational fear that manifests itself in divisive bias?
However, if these really are the times we live in, shouldn’t aviation authorities be doing a little more to help people identify the terrorists in their midst? Rather than making us sit through demonstrations of how to insert one end of a seatbelt into another, airlines should be showing us the best way to racially profile our fellow passengers. While we await the modernisation of inflight safety briefings, I have taken it upon myself to provide some helpful pointers as to how to spot a terrorist at 30,000 feet. So, ladies and gentlemen, for the next few paragraphs, I would like your complete attention …
Hipster or terrorist? Know the difference
Unprecedented numbers of young men currently labour under the delusion that beards are attractive. This means that there will probably be a fecundity of facial hair on your next flight – not all of which will be fundamentalist. Please take a few moments to locate your nearest beard and assess whether it belongs to a hipster or a terrorist. You are, of course, entitled to argue that hipster-led gentrification is itself a form of urban terrorism, in which case I’d suggest dashing off 800 words on the matter instead.
First-class weaponry
Taking a knife on to a flight is frowned upon for security reasons. However, if you happen to turn left when you board the plane you are given a variety of sharp knives and glassware at mealtime. I can only assume that intelligence agencies have data which shows that terrorists are more likely to be sitting in the cheap seats. This makes no sense. If I were going to blow myself up on a plane (I’m not, despite my questionable name), I would not add insult to injury by flying economy.
Rather than showing safety demonstrations, airlines should be helping us to racially profile our fellow passengers
Recognise terrorist toilet time
Ten minutes locked in the toilet means someone is suffering explosive bowel movements from the airplane lasagne. Any longer than that and they’re probably going to blow up the plane. It’s just maths, really.
Beware of scarlet hair
According to Breitbart, a rightwing blog read – according to some experts – by people who aren’t very bright, redheads are more likely to be terrorists. The site notes that white “Islamic extremists reported on by the media are 15 times more likely than the general population to have red hair”. The rationale for this, Breitbart writes, “at least according to some experts”, is the “bullying and persecution [redheads] endure early in life”.
Yallah, yallah
Anyone who says “Allah” on a plane is 99.9% likely to be a terrorist, at least according to some experts. However, the tricky thing is that a lot of innocuous slang in Arabic sounds vaguely like “Allah”. Take “Yallah” for example, which means “hurry the eff up”. If the guy next to you is muttering “yallah, yallah” to himself he is probably not saying his last prayer, he maybe just wants the food to arrive.
Keep calm among the carry on
Jokes aside, it’s always worth reminding yourself of the cheery fact that you’re probably more likely to die from airplane food than from terrorism. So next time you worry that the brown guy in seat 32E looks murderous, resist Mile High Hysteria. He’s probably not Isis; he probably just wishes he hadn’t eaten that lasagna.
Ghulam Rasool alias Chotoo, the ringleader of the Chotoo gang, against whom security forces have launched a major operation, worked as a security guard for MPA Atif Mazari for three to five years in Rojhan, according to police officials.
He also worked for the Punjab police as an informer till 2007 and used to inform police about gangs involved in robberies and kidnapping for ransom in Rajanpur and Muzaffargarh districts.
According to locals and police, Chotoo belongs to Bakrani clan of Mazari tribe of Rojhan area. He later developed differences with police over unknown reasons and established his own gang to carry out criminal activities.
Some small and prominent gangs operating in Rojhan, Dera Ghazi Khan and adjoining districts of Sindh and Balochistan also joined the Chotoo gang. They include Bilal alias Bilali Jaakha, Baba Long, Gumani Gopang, Sindhi group, Bosans of Muzaffargrah and Khalid Kajlani.
The Bilali Jaakha gang was formed by two brothers — Bilal Jaakha and Jugnu Jaakha. They are said to be implicated in a fake case for killing two sisters of Gopang tribe of Rajanpur. It is said the women were killed by their tribe but it implicated the Jaakha brothers in the case because of an old enmity.
The two brothers were reportedly acquitted of the murder charge by a court. During their time in jail they developed links with criminals and after their release killed their ‘enemies’ and joined the Chotoo gang.
The criminals who were declared proclaimed offenders in different areas of south Punjab and Sindh used to take shelter in localities under the control of Chotoo.
The small gangs, after kidnapping businessmen and professionals from areas as far as Karachi, Balochistan and Rahimyar Khan, sell them to Chotoo for Rs400,000 to Rs500,000. A former fugitive who had spent more than a year with the Chotoo gang said Chotoo got bigger ransom amount for their release.
The Punjab police have so far carried out six to seven operations against the Chotoo gang and lost at least 30 policemen. Some gangsters were also killed.
The riverine area of Kachi Jamal in Rajanpur, a stronghold of the Chotoo gang, has a population of more than 10,000 people living in small villages. They depend mostly on rearing animals and farming. Chotoo is known for helping the locals and never carried out any criminal activity in the area. But he made it a no-go area for police who found it almost impossible to get information about him from the locals.
Earlier, the Bosan gang headed by Zafar Bosan and Tariq Bosan were the uncrowned rulers of the area till 2003-04. They were later eliminated by police.
The biggest operation carried out by Rajanpur and Rahimyar Khan police against the Chotoo gang was in 2010 which continued for three months, but to no avail. The last operation was conducted in 2013.
During an operation in Kotla Mughlan area of Rajanpur some years ago, police, however, succeeded in recovering a doctor from the gang and killing a gangster.
CURRENT OPERATION: Local police wanted to carry out the operation against the Chotoo gang in a careful manner, cordoning off the area by setting up checkposts and bunkers nearby, slowly closing in on the outlaws.
But Punjab IG Mushtaq Sukhera was in a hurry.
According to a police officer who was onboard a boat which came under attack by the Chotoo gang on April 13, the local police opposed the way the IG wanted to carry out the operation.
They told him that the gang had more sophisticated weapons and capacity than police and only the army could counter them. But the IG said the Punjab government didn’t want to involve the army in the matter as it was against its policy.
The officer said that when the police refused to attack the gang without any proper planning and sought some time, the IG dared them, saying he would himself go to the riverine area if they didn’t.
At this, regional and district police officers begged their subordinates to save their prestige.
“Policemen in two boats moved into the area along both banks of the river. The boats came under attack. One of them was captured by the gangsters and the other in which I was got fired on,” the officer said, adding that police returned fire and killed two gangsters.
Four policemen were killed during the gunbattle, while another succumbed to his injuries in a hospital.
Surprisingly, the ground operation was being led by SHOs, though all senior officials, including DSPs, SPs, DPOs, RPOs and the IG, were present there.
When Chotoo came to know that an SHO was among the captured policemen, he separated him from other captives and shot him dead on the spot.
Due to haste and flawed planning of the IG, seven policemen have lost their lives while 27 others are still in captivity of the gangsters.
Chottu is an enterprising individual. He operates out of his Corporate Headquarters in Kacha Jamal area of Rajan Pur forest. He was a petty thief in 1987. He is now the Chief Executive of a private militia which can easily take on the entire police force of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In an an-going encounter that has already lasted about 2 weeks, he has killed 7 and captured 25 policemen. The police in Pakistan, trained only to protect the ruling elite is not used to fighting criminals. It must therefore now look up to either Army or Allah for help.
We have buried our heads in the sand, never admitting the existence of hundreds of ‘Chottus’ and ‘Barrus’. Both plunder the poor of Pakistan. The ‘Chottus’ seek refuge in domestic sanctuaries while the ‘Barrus’ invest in off-shore companies. They operate their private militias and control their autonomous territories. They have been allowed to grow into such formidable militant entities despite Article 256 of the Constitution, which categorically states that ‘no private organisation capable of functioning as a military organisation shall be formed and any such organisation shall be illegal’.
It is not wise to first allow a problem to grow into the size of a monster and then be forced to undertake huge expeditions, ‘Zarb-e-Aahan’ being the latest of the series.
What stops the government to launch a ‘Zarb-e-Aman’, that should begin by a proactive demand for surrender of all weapons and abolition of all private militias. Must we remain endlessly engaged in reactionary conflicts and become voluntary hostages to the ‘Chottus’ and the ‘Barrus’ of our own creation.
In the year since Pakistani investigators raided Axact, a Karachi-based software company accused of raking in hundreds of millions of dollars with a vast Internet degree scam, Pakistani and American investigators have been busy dismantling its operations.
Fourteen Axact employees, including the chief executive, await trial on charges of fraud, extortion and money laundering. Bank accounts in Pakistan and the United States have been frozen. Investigators have uncovered a tangled web of corporate entities — dozens of shell companies and associates, from Caribbean tax havens to others in Delaware, Dubai and Singapore — used to funnel illicit earnings back to Pakistan.
New details suggest that Axact’s fraud empire, already considered one of the biggest Internet scams on record, is bigger than initially imagined. Over the past decade, Axact took money from at least 215,000 people in 197 countries — one-third of them from the United States. Sales agents wielded threats and false promises and impersonated government officials, earning the company at least $89 million in its final year of operation.
Those findings stem from financial and customer records, company registrations, sworn testimony, communications between Pakistani and American officials, and hundreds of hours of taped phone conversations filed in court. The records have been made available to The New York Times in the months since a Times article detailing the company’s scheme prompted police raids and the collapse not just of Axact, but also of the company’s new national news channel, Bol.
The case against Axact, which at first seemed a rare instance in which tycoons with powerful connections were being held to criminal account, has increasingly appeared in recent months to be in jeopardy.
The leading prosecutor quit with little explanation, hinting that he had come under political pressure to soft-pedal the case. A trial date for the company’s executives has not been set, and several judges have dropped out of the case. Some media analysts, noting that Axact’s jailed chief executive, Shoaib Ahmed Shaikh, has publicly boasted of his work for the Pakistani military, speculate that his powerful connections may yet work in his favor.
“There’s been a huge amount of speculation and analysis and deep-throated conspiracy theories,” said Hasan Zaidi, a filmmaker and media analyst based in Karachi.
Axact had been in business for nearly 10 years at the time of the arrests in May, and the company and its founder appeared ever more eager to step into the public spotlight, seemingly unconcerned about the risk. Most prominently, Axact was preparing to introduce Bol, a television network with 2,200 employees that had started test transmissions in the days before the police raids.
Comparing himself to Microsoft’s Bill Gates, Mr. Shaikh had touted Axact as Pakistan’s leading software exporter. He laid out an ambitious plan to provide education for millions of Pakistani children, and he wreathed himself in patriotism: In the corner of his office, near a passage leading to a bedroom and a private swimming pool, the eagle-crested Axact company flag stood alongside a furled Pakistani standard.
Once the police investigation began, Mr. Shaikh instructed subordinates to burn company documents at a vacant lot and to destroy computer drives, some of which were later cast into the sea, another executive testified to the police.
But Mr. Shaikh could not prevent the seizure of a vast trove of data, some recovered from computer disks as they were being deleted, that led investigators to conclude that Axact’s main business was providing fake degrees.
The police found more than one million blank educational certificates and evidence of 300 fictitious educational websites, many with American-sounding names like Columbiana and Brooklyn Park, that sold fake degrees to hundreds of thousands of people around the world. Some knowingly bought effortless degrees to pad résumés or to help in immigration, and a handful have been publicly embarrassed.
Many other customers, investigators quickly realized, had fallen victim to an elaborate and aggressive fraud, going to Axact-run websites for a legitimate online education only to be intimidated into making ever larger payments.
Hundreds of hours of taped phone conversations, extracted from Axact servers and cited by prosecutors, showed sales agents impersonating American lawyers or State Department officials in an effort to collect more money from customers, mostly in the Middle East.
The television network Bol, owned by Axact, was conducting transmission tests when the raids took place and was shuttered as a result of the case.
In one recording from 2014, Riaz Ahmed Shaikh, a Pakistani living in Abu Dhabi, pleaded for respite from “Jacob” — a man who he believed was calling from the legal office of a university in California but was in fact an Axact sales agent in Karachi, according to police records.
“Please, please, Mr. Jacob,” said Mr. Shaikh, who said he had already paid $150,000 to Axact. “I have sold all of my assets to pay this last amount. I am not eating well. I am not sleeping well.”
“Look, you’re not paying that much,” the sales agent cajoled, before holding out a threat of possible police action. “Just another $10,000.”
Axact executives took extraordinary measures to disguise their links to fraud. In a lawsuit in the United States, in which former customers of the online Belford High School were seeking damages, Axact officials persuaded an attendant in the company’s cafeteria to pose as the founder of the school, a police report said.
The worker, Salem Kureshi, conducted a webcam video deposition in 2011 for the American court. In it, he merely moved his lips while, off camera, an Axact official voiced a set of evasive answers for the American lawyers, Mr. Kureshi told the police.
After the police raided Axact last year, Mr. Kureshi added, executives paid him $250 to go into hiding in his hometown, 700 miles from Karachi.
In Pakistan, the plight of Axact’s victims has been largely overshadowed by the media furor surrounding the Bol network, which had hired some of the country’s most prominent journalists before it closed. With their salaries suddenly cut off, many employees took to the streets to protest, saying Axact was the victim of a conspiracy by rival news organizations.
Shoaib Ahmed Shaikh insists that he earned his wealth through legitimate software exports. He has hired Shaukat Hayat, a lawyer whose client list includes Pervez Musharraf, the former Pakistan president, to defend him.
In a telephone interview, Mr. Hayat said the case against Mr. Shaikh and his fellow executives had been cooked up by the news media. “They have not committed any illegal action,” he said.
Mr. Shaikh also faces scrutiny from American investigators. In a letter to the Pakistani authorities in February, United States officials said the F.B.I. had identified Axact as a “diploma mill” that operated a “worldwide web of shell companies and associates.” Three of the main shell companies, registered in Delaware, were found to have been owned by Mr. Shaikh or his associates, the letter said.
Other company documents point to shell holdings in the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Dubai and Panama. In several instances, Mr. Shaikh appears to have used a pseudonym, Ryan Jones, to sign company documents. He became a citizen of St. Kitts and Nevis, a small Caribbean island that sells passports to rich investors.
In the Belford case, lawyers have obtained a court order freezing three American bank accounts containing $675,000. In a sworn statement, Mr. Shaikh admitted ownership of some of those accounts.
His sister, Uzma Shaheen, who lives in Chicago, has been called to testify. Documents filed in court show that Ms. Shaheen transferred more than $37 million from American bank accounts to Axact in Pakistan in recent years.
Still, much of Axact’s global network remains undisrupted. It controls 32 other bank accounts — in the United States, Ireland, Dubai, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, and Singapore — that are thought to contain millions of dollars, according to prosecution documents.
And in Pakistan, the case has run into quicksand. Two judges have recused themselves without explanation; so has Zahid Jamil, an ambitious prosecutor who built much of the case against Axact but quit abruptly in February, citing unspecified circumstances “that make it impossible for me to proceed further.”
Nighat Dad of the Digital Rights Foundation, an Internet advocacy group in Pakistan, said the Axact case showed that good laws also needed political will if they were to succeed.
“If the evidence is so clear, and there is so much of it, then why is the case against Axact taking so long?” she asked. “Something must be happening behind closed doors.”